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Abstract 
Cities offer enormous opportunities for climate action that would limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C by 2100 above pre-industrial levels. For example, cities can act through planning and 
service delivery, bringing together residential, work and leisure in single spaces, and creating  
better connectivity between areas within and between cities.  In Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) cities offer multiple opportunities for low carbon innovations given that so much of the 
cities in LDCs are yet to be built and serviced. The development of high carbon strategies, on the 
other hand, poses the danger of long-term carbon lock-in and narrows the  existing window of 
opportunity to act. This paper explores the low carbon opportunities and avoided future 
emissions that cities in LDCs can implement as part of their mitigation pathways.  The paper 
makes the case that deep mitigation efforts in the context of LDCs will need to take place within 
the broader agenda of sustainable development, poverty reduction, and equity.  Examples of 
transport, energy and low carbon urbanism are discussed as evidence that climate-resilient 
development, consistent with the 1.5°C pathway, is already underway in some LDCs. 
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Introduction 
The central aim of the Paris Agreement is to strengthen the global response to keep a global 
temperature rise this century well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to 
limit temperature increase to 1.5°C.  The voluntary pledges in Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) are currently tracking toward a warming of 3-4°C above pre-industrial 
temperatures  [1]. Current efforts are insufficient to keep temperature changes under safe levels.  
Decarbonization at all levels is required.  Deep decarbonisation requires a profound 
transformation of economic and energy systems [2], fostered by catalytic, transformative 
strategies. Deep decarbonisation implies a realignment of current systems of production and 
consumption within global environmental limits. In this context, deep mitigation refers to the 
compendium of strategic actions that can deliver deep decarbonisation. The transformations 
required for deep decarbonisation may also have co-benefits for energy poverty and improving 
energy access, and hence, they could have a direct impact on enhancing wellbeing and 
livelihoods in many countries [2].  
The inclusion of the HQYLURQPHQWDOODZSULQFLSOHRI³&RPPRQ%XW'LIIHUHQWLDWHG
5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV´Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration) in climate agreements since the 
Kyoto Protocol reflects a concern with equity between countries in the Global South and Global 
North  [3]. Over the past decade, however, discourses about the implementation of this principle 
and calls for global mitigation action has extended responsibilities for proportional mitigation 
action to every country  [4]. In the current economic system, countries may object to the 
implementation of mitigation strategies if it does not address existing concerns or prevents less 
developed countries to use their natural resource endownments, for example [5].  In Least 
Developed Countries (LCDs) the relevance of deep mitigation strategies depends on their 
alignment with strategies designed to address pressing development concerns.  Simultaneously, 
deep mitigation is about how the future is played out to the extent that the choices made today 
everywhere will likely have global implications. These observations raise the dilemma addressed 
in this paper: Is deep mitigation a burden for LCDs or an opportunity to foster alternative, 
sustainable futures?  
The dilemma of deep mitigation in LDCs.  
The comparatively low rates of emissions per capita in LDCs compared with other country 
categories (Figure 1) have long supported the argument that mitigation in LDCs is 
inconsequential to achieve global emission reductions. Even considering the emissions in urban 
areas, where there are relatively high rates of energy and service access, the per capita emissions 
in LDCs are extremely low by global standards.  For example, African urban emissions are 
estimated at 1.8 t CO2 per capita, compared with the 15.6 tCO2 per capita for North America, 6.9 
tonnes for Western Europe, and 6.5 tonnes for China [6]. If emissions from South Africa and 
North African countries are omitted, the per capita emissions levels across the rest of urban 
Africa are reduced even further to under 0.5 t CO2 per capita, suggesting that African cities have 
limited scope for influencing the current rate of global warming.  Deep mitigation should not be 
a burden that LDCs carry without support. Such is the argument, for example, of defendants of 
µGHYHORSPHQWILUVW¶ which request the prioritisation of pressing development interventions to 
meet social and economic goals  [7].   
What happens if deep mitigation offers an opportunity to move society towards a sustainable 
pathway that delivers quality of life and better opportunities for citizens? For example, current 
rates of emissions do not reflect the significant levels of suppressed demand for services due to 
the persistence of precarious livelihoods, low income, poor infrastructure and inequalities in 
LDCs.  Such suppressed demand represents a higher quantity of µYLUWXDO¶emissions locked into 
potential consumption if services are met via conventional technologies. Low carbon emissions, 
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in this account, are a symptom of the political economy of LDCs and the marginal position 
LDCs occupy in the global economy. The aspiration within those countries is to achieve levels of 
autonomy, well-being, and opportunity comparable with those in countries with higher rates of 
historical and current emissions. Taking this into consideration, a scenario of increasing per 
capita emissions of the majority RI/'&$IULFD¶VLQKDELWDQWV to meet their basic needs is likely.  
 
Figure 1: CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) in Least Development Countries, World, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and selected countries (Data: World Development Indicators) 
Long-term scales are central to examine deep decarbonisation pathways [8]. Lucas et al. [9] 
DUJXHWKDWZLWKRXWFOLPDWHSROLF\$IULFD¶VHQHUJ\-related CO2 emissions are projected to 
increase by a factor of 7 to 50 between 2010 and 2100 ± primarily driven by population growth 
and economic development, and the continued reliance of fossil fuel sources.  Moreover, a slow 
transition from charcoal based household energy systems to clean and modern energy options 
combined with rapid urbanization could contribute to higher energy-related CO2 emissions [9]. 
Deep mitigation is an opportunity for LDCs to pioneer alternatives to deliver sustainable 
societies and economies, pursuing a different development pathway than industrialised and 
emerging economies. 
In studies of urban adaptation to climate change there is a generalized acceptance that co-
benefits represents an effective way to frame climate change policies and programmes [10,11]. 
The same argument pertains actions towards deep mitigation. In cities in less developed areas, 
interventions in sectors such as transport or waste can help achieve emission reductions and 
improved health outcomes simultaneously [12].  Mitigation actions in the energy sector and 
transport together have the potential to improve public health [13, 14] reduce air pollution [15] 
[16], improve mobility and communications, and improve microclimates and habitability [17]. 
Mitigation has also been linked with economic benefits such as reductions in the unemployment 
rate [18].  Indeed, planning is a crucial means to bring together mitigation and adaptation actions 
while also enabling other co-benefits to address the structural determinants of both vulnerability 
and high carbon consumption [30]. The consideration of such co-benefits can have a catalyzing 
effect to facilitate low carbon development and investment in urban areas in LDCs [20].  
Technological, institutional and behavioural inertia create obstacles to the pace of change needed 
to bring countries in a deep mitigation pathway.  For example, in 2016, fossil fuel financing still 
made up a significant proportion of the energy portfolio of the major multilateral development 
banks (MDB), with most of the transactions approved since the Paris Agreement [21].  This is in 
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line with a previous report by Christian Aid [22] that challenged the notion of funding of fossil 
fuel projects for development because this approach relies on a false choice between addressing 
poverty and addressing climate.  Not only low carbon development is a strategy to deliver energy 
access in previously unreachable areas, but also, LDCs have the potential to become leaders in 
low carbon innovation because their energy systems have room to innovate and experiment.  The 
µ&SDWKZD\¶represents a boundary to prevent impacts that would detract from poverty 
reduction and sustainable development efforts in LDCs. 
7KHLGHDRIµOHDSIURJJLQJ¶LVRQHRIWKHPRVWFRPSHOOLQJDUJXPHQWVIRUGHHSPLWLJDWLRQLQ/'&V. 
µ7KH1HZ&OLPDWH(FRQRP\¶ the flagship project of the Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate chaired by Vicente Calderon, former president of Mexico, advances this idea [23]. 
In the UHSRUWWKH&RPPLVVLRQDUJXHVWKDW³Iuture economic growth does not have to copy the 
high-carbon, unevenly distributed model of the past´SInstead, they ask a question about 
KRZWRGHOLYHULQYHVWPHQWVWKDWOHDGWRµEHWWHUJURZWK¶. µBetter growWK¶ LV³JURZWKWKDWLV
inclusive (in the sense of distributing its rewards widely, particularly to the poorest); builds 
resilience; strengthens local communities and increases their economic freedom; improves the 
quality of life in a variety of ways, from local air quality to commuting times; and sustains the 
QDWXUDOHQYLURQPHQW´S For other commentators, leapfrogging implies jumping out of the 
discourse of growth altogether: rather than decoupling economic growth from emissions, they 
recognise that we can decouple prosperity from economic growth [24]. Virtually all the 
leapfrogging narratives invariably speak to the dynamics of innovation, involving technological, 
institutional and social innovation. The rapid adoption of mobile technologies and decentralised 
systems of energy production (such as solar home systems) are often invoked as evidence of the 
potential for leapfrogging in less-developed economies in Africa [25].  
However, the question is to what extent these positive outlooks on deep mitigation merely 
reproduce western-inspired models of development without considering contexts in LDCs. 
Technological solutions for reducing emissions may not address the pressing development 
problems of LDCs [26]. Looking at low carbon transitions in six countries, Newell and Bulkeley 
demonstrate how the political economy shapes the possibilities of action, in a context in which 
there is no cohesive state managing the transition and enforcing rules [4]. Translating deep 
mitigation policies without deep analysis of their development benefits and costs across contexts 
may be grossly inappropriate in LDCs. 
The New Climate Economy report, for example, suggests that cities and urban areas provide 
vital levers for climate action. Urbanisation in the 21st century is associated with land 
transformations (i.e., the increase of the urban land footprint per inhabitant) and increased 
consumption of natural resources and energy for the production of buildings and urban 
infrastructure [27]. There are indeed multiple and varied strategies to reduce carbon emissions in 
cities. However, urbanisation is also a multidimensional process which manifests differently 
everywhere.  Reports such as this hardly represent examples of mitigation strategies in LDCs 
and reproduce a specific model of urban growtKQRWDOZD\VYLDEOH7KHIRFXVRQµZKDWWRGR¶
leaves less space to tailor strategies to different contexts. While the urban sustainability 
transition will involve radical changes anywhere, such changes will need to adjust to the specific 
conditions of implementation in urbanisation contexts [28].  
In alignment with Elinor Ostrom¶VWKHVLV RQµEH\RQGSDQDFHDV¶ the deep mitigation question is 
RQHLQZKLFKWKHPD[LPµQRSDQDFHDV¶holds significant meaning [29]. Indeed, deep mitigation 
opens up opportunities for LDCs, but only when the proposals for decarbonisation pathways 
relate to local aspirations and opportunities for co-benefits. From a global perspective, 
considering deep mitigation in LDCs requires going EH\RQGDVNLQJµZKDWWRGR¶LQDFKLHYLQJ
GHHSPLWLJDWLRQWRµKRZWRGRLW¶ and how deep mitigation can be advanced in a manner that 
prioritises the well-being and the opportunities of citizens. To exemplify this, we engage with the 
question of deep mitigation in two contexts of urbanisation in LDCs.  
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Urbanization and the opportunity for deep mitigation 
To explore the complexities of deep mitigation and urbanisation in LDCs, we examine briefly 
two vignettes from Ethiopia and Mozambique. (WKLRSLD¶VDPELWLRXVJURZWKDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
plan (GTP), launched in 2011, has been running alongside the climate resilient green economy 
(CRGE) strategy [30]. The rapidly expanding capital city and the secondary cities across the 
country are important arenas where this development-climate interplay is being negotiated. The 
transport sector is particularly relevant because transportation accounts for nearly 50% of the 
COၷ  emissions in Addis Ababa [31, 32]± largely driven by increasing population and rapid 
spatial expansion of the city.  The Light Rail Transit (LRT) Project in Addis Ababa symbolizes 
this challenge, emphasizing the need for increased investment in the high-level infrastructure of 
the city as part of the process of urban modernization.  Supported by Chinese capital, the LRT 
system has two perpendicular tracks, each approximately 17 km long, and it is highly 
advantageous regarding users, with about of 60,000 passengers per hour [33].  One of its key 
defining features is that the trains are powered with electricity, and given the low emissions 
factor of the counWU\¶VJULGWKHFXPXODWLYHHPLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQSRWHQWLDORIWKH/57V\VWHPis 
forecasted at 1.8 million tCO2e by 2030 [33].  This technical outcome slots into a government 
narrative that continued investment in renewable energy technologies provides the means to 
decarbonize the rest of the economy.  The project is widely considered to have provided an 
infrastructure boost and inspired an appetite for innovative and ambitious actions, but some 
outstanding challenges remain such as the long distance between pedestrian crossings and 
questions on how well the LRT infrastructure is integrated the existing transport system. More 
data and research is needed in order to accurately assess the development and climate impacts of 
this initiative.  
In the city of Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, charcoal remains the main source of energy 
for the large majority of households, despite claims of the imminent transition to cleaner fuels. A 
locally-based NGOs called AVSI are delivering a cookstove improvement programme. They 
argue that the traditional iron cookstove used in Maputo is hardly more efficient than a simple 
three-stone fire. Qualitative research in one of the target neighbourhoods in Maputo shows that 
there is potential for cookstoves to provide better energy services to local households, reducing 
their fuel costs and the pollution associated with cooking. They have found some barriers to their 
improved cookstove replacement programme. The evidence points towards the mismatch 
between cooking practices, the built environment and the cookstove [34].  For example, some 
residents point out that the cookstoves are just too small. Others complain about imported 
cookstoves and the impact that may have on the local supply chain of cookstoves. In the past few 
years, the price of LPG has dropped, while the cost of charcoal has increased because of 
problems of supply. This structural change, however, has not translated directly into a transition 
towards LPG. What deep mitigation strategies are available in Maputo? The fact that LPG is 
considered a cleaner fuel in policy circles contrasts with the persistence of the use of charcoal 
among local residents, which they find familiar and reliable. Attempts to introduce alternative 
fuels, such as ethanol, have not prospered either. In urban Mozambique, as in other LDCs, 
charcoal may be a principal means whereby people claim energy justice DJDLQVWµproducts of elite 
interpretations of modernist development ideology, excluding the voices of those involved in 
local fuel production and use¶  [35]. In this case, there is a need to understand the kind of 
technologies used and how they are embedded in everyday life. The extent to which improved 
cookstoves programmes contribute to deep mitigation is conditional to particular visions of the 
future in which there is little space to explore renewable or low carbon alternatives. In this case, 
low carbon action involving renewables beyond LPG can directly improve the lives of people by 
improving energy access and health outcomes [36]. 
The $IULFD¶V8UEDQ5HYROXWLRQJRHVEH\RQGWKHUHODWLYHO\fast-paced growth of urban population 
and increased rate of land conversion in urban areas [37].  Such revolution entails a profound 
process of economic and social transformation deeply rooted in a history of inequality and 
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colonial dominance [38].  One example of the deeply contextual nature of urban change is the 
pretended link between urbanisation and economic growth in African cities. On the one hand, it 
seems that, if anything, economic processes foster spatial reconfiguration, rather than 
urbanisation being a force for economic growth [39]. Alongside positive scenarios emerge 
voices that caution against overlooking the impacts of urbanisation in specific locales. As Iván 
Turok has argued ³JURZWKIXHOOHGE\KDUYHVWLQJ$IULFD¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVZLOOSURduce skewed 
outcomes, little employment where it is needed most, and inflated urban property prices that 
could crowd out expansion RIRWKHUSURGXFWLYHDFWLYLWLHV´>40]. 
Assessments such as the New Climate Economy report proposes models of compact and 
connected urbanism, mainly emphasising the opportunities for spatial planning and coordination  
[23]. While speaking of a uniform rate of rapid urbanisation everywhere, this approach does not 
reflect the various realities on the ground and the scale of urban change in the African LDCs 
[38]. The assumption is that accelerated patterns of unguided urbanisation constitute a major 
threat to sustainable futures in LDCs in Africa [37]. However, the challenges related to 
urbanisation in Africa are often derived from the implementation of inappropriate models of 
colonial and postcolonial development rather than only from the actual lack of planning [41, 42]. 
Sustainability and low carbon concerns- such as compact city models or models that increase 
connectivity- can motivate urban projects that not only do not match the needs of African cities 
but also, threaten the lives of those living in those cities [43]. Back to the vignettes above, in 
Addis Ababa the deep mitigation strategy is not the BRT per se, but rather, the possibility of 
delivering better mobility options to its citizens through forms of public transport. Similarly, in 
Maputo, the question is not to provide improved cookstoves but rather, to understand local 
energy needs and why are they not met. In both cases, deep decarbonisation departs from within 
FLWL]HQV¶DVSLUDWLRQVDQGWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRDFKLHYHWKHP.  
Deep mitigation creates new demands and scenarios for development planning in LDCs, but may 
not be possible without consideration of winners and losers, hidden costs, and the differential 
power within social and environmental outcomes of deep mitigation policies. Rather than asking 
what is deep mitigation, a more pragmatic question of how to achieve deep mitigation in every 
context emphasises the extent to which mitigation policies will also deliver better futures for all.  
Deep development and deep mitigation 
The opportunity to transition towards sustainable and just outcomes offers a reason for optimism 
in LDCs because alternative futures can develop in economies that are less locked in existing 
social and technological regimes [44, 45].  
For LDCs, remaining in their current low carbon state and transition towards climate-resilient 
pathways means embracing a contextualised vision of development.  Firstly, deep mitigation 
transformations would need to happen alongside other major social and economic 
transformations to meet sustainable development goals. There is mounting evidence of 
migration, rapid economic growth, international investment and technological transformations 
across Africa [45, 46].  The question is whether these transformations will be accompanied by 
parallel improvements for everyone in health and wellbeing, economic and educational 
opportunities, political stability, and environmental quality [47].  
Secondly, deep mitigation strategies need to address the structural challenges faced by LDCs. 
Adaptation is related to development objectives, particularly development actions that address 
the underlying structural causes of vulnerability [48,49]. Similarly, mitigation is related to the 
structural conditions that permit societies to thrive, including opening up opportunities for social 
and technological innovation. The increasing blurred boundary between adaptation and 
mitigation points towards the need to bring an integrative perspective that emphasizes the deep 
transformations involved in adaptation, mitigation, and development, particularly when thinking 
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of urban areas [27]. These interactions, however, have to be taken with caution as there is a risk 
of conflating development aid and climate policies, which may lead to a reduction of overall 
development budgets [49].  
Thirdly, deep mitigation demands robust cross-sectoral conversations as a way to widen 
participation, create collective ownership and build consensus around decisions about 
development pathways.  Opportunities for avoiding future emissions exist, and policymakers 
across the LDCs will have to adopt a reflexive and cooperative approach to policy and practice, 
often challenging their assumptions and entrenched institutional behaviours [50].  LDC structural 
transformations will in many cases involve a massive capital injection in infrastructure. This 
opens both opportunities and risks for avoiding future costs of GHG mitigation and pollution 
abatement interventions [51]. Moreover, infrastructure investment will not be always necessary 
and sufficient. There is an urgent need for alternative future visions of deep mitigation and 
sustainable prosperity that engage with the aspirations of LDCs from within the context in which 
such visions will be implemented. The dominance of models of mitigation based on narrow 
perspectives of development [52] creates obstacles to envisioning how a low carbon future 
would look like in LDCs.  
Ultimately, the main question is whose views are prioritised in delivering both climate change 
mitigation and development. The debates leading up to the sustainable development goals show 
that achieving consensus about broader visions may be easier than establishing clear roadmaps 
towards action on the ground. The experience of development and its critique highlights the need 
to move away from simple notions of development as freedom from poverty and understand the 
wide range of aspirations that people have, including the right to self-determination [53].  The 
debates on the future of development, as articulated in the Sustainable Development Goals, 
suggest the need for a greater emphasis on addressing structural inequality and fostering social 
solidarity globally [54].  The incorporation of progressive notions of development, however, is 
not always accompanied by commensurate measures on the ground [28].  For example, the 
emphasis of elites in LDCs to pursue fossil-fuel reliant development by evoking the principle of 
³ULJKWWRGHYHORSPHQW´FRXOGOHDGWRXQVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWRXWFRPHVLQWKHORQJUXQ 
Conclusion 
We argue that deep mitigation is a prerequisite for limiting the long-term temperature goal to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.  Deep mitigation is not an objective but an ideal that can guide 
actions of sustainable development in different countries, as long as it is interpreted and 
redefined within the particular context of implementation. Linking deep mitigation and 
development aspirations in LDCs, particularly in Africa, is a means to increase resources and 
capacity for addressing the structural causes of vulnerability, and link resource consumption with 
improvements in wellbeing.  Opportunities for deep mitigation are particularly salient in cities.  
The examples in Ethiopia and Mozambique show that there are opportunities for countries to 
implement emissions avoidance policies in areas of mobility and energy services.  However, the 
actual impacts of low carbon projects need to demonstrate a deeper development benefit in ways 
of improving quality of life directly. Deep mitigation strategies should be  transformative, both 
in material terms (reducing emissions significantly) and in political terms (enabling the 
materialisation of bottom-up visions of development). In the context of the need to align action 
to advance the SDGs, there is an urgent need for research which engages with the practical 
consequences of low carbon transitions in LDCs and that prioritises, above all, the development 
of local visions to advance inclusive urban futures. 
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